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Abstract 
Drawing on workers’ surveys and workplace interviews, this article investigates the growth of 
temporary work in German manufacturing sectors since the eighties. Findings partly confirm a 
“dualization” scenario as workers without industry-specific vocational training are more likely 
to be on a temporary contract than skilled workers, and the gap has widened over time. 
However, also skilled workers have become increasingly vulnerable to casualization due to job 
routine and the erosion of industrial relations. Evidence confirms the crucial role of institutions 
in supporting the linkage between specific skills and employment stability, and suggest that the 
liberalization of the employment relationship has the potential to advance also in the core of 
the German economy. 
Wordcount: 8,504  
 
1 Introduction  
This article investigates the relationship between skills, industrial relations institutions and the 
use of temporary work in German core manufacturing sectors in the last thirty years. This issue 
is central to academic debates about the changes undergone by the German “coordinated” 
model of production, which used to rely on strong industrial relations institutions and on a 
permanent skilled workforce (Hall and Soskice 2001; Streeck 1991).  
 
2 
 
According to Streeck (1991; 1992), institutional “beneficial constraints” were at the origin of 
the German model: Collective bargaining agreements, strict employment protection legislation 
and strong labor representation at workplace limited the ability of management to dismiss their 
workers or hire on precarious contracts, forcing them to invest in training broad workforce 
segments in order to increase productivity and to compress labor costs. Skilled workers – called 
Facharbeiter1 - and their works councils pushed for the implementation of a  work organization 
characterized by teamwork, task rotation and autonomy, which required workers’ “redundant” 
capacities and employment stability (Kern and Schumann 1984; Streeck 1991).  
 
However, institutional constraints have eroded during the last twenty years (Artus 2001; Hassel 
1999), and the German model has moved away from the traditional coordinated model. Some 
political economy scholars claim that the German political economy is now divided between a 
service periphery, characterized by low-skill and volatile jobs, and core manufacturing sectors, 
where coordinating institutions are still in place. The resilient coordination is mainly attributed 
to employers, supported by works councils, who want to retain their “specific”-skilled workers 
required by high-quality export production (Hassel 2014; Palier and Thelen 2010; Thelen 
2014;).  
 
Other scholars in the field of sociology and industrial relations, however, claim that not even 
in core manufacturing sectors job security can be ensured without strong industrial relations 
institutions (Benassi and Dorigatti 2015; Doellgast and Greer 2007). This claim is supported 
by mounting evidence that employers in core manufacturing sectors have increasingly used 
subcontractors and contingent work since the nineties (Eichhorst 2015; Jürgens 2004).  
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These contradicting accounts about the liberalization of the employment relationship in 
German core manufacturing sectors feed into, first, a broader debate about the role of 
employers’ interests (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001) vs. industrial relations 
institutions for determining workers’ outcomes (Gallie 2007; Lloyd et al. 2013). Second, they 
reflect the opposing stances within the debate about the changing trajectory of coordinated 
economies, which expect respectively dualization between core manufacturing and services 
(Hassel 2014; Thelen 2014) and progressive liberalization (Baccaro and Howell 2011; Streeck 
2009) until ‚the fringe will eat the core’ (Streeck 2010: 512). 
 
This paper aims to contribute to both debates. The originality of the analysis consists in 
combining the quantitative analysis of the workers’ surveys of the Federal Institute of 
Vocational Training and Education (1986-2012) with interview findings in German automotive 
and machine tool building plants. The use of mixed methods allows to better illustrate the 
liberalization of the employment relationship and the mechanisms underlying the diffusion 
patterns of temporary work in German core manufacturing sectors. The dualization literature 
focuses only on the national level either through qualitative studies (Hassel 2014; Thelen 2014) 
or cross-national quantitative studies on the incidence of nonstandard work across sectors, 
occupations and skill levels (Gebel and Giesecke 2011; Häusermann and Schwander 2012). In 
contrast, research in industrial relations mainly relies on qualitative case studies at workplace, 
which do not give a clear overall picture of changes over time in German core manufacturing 
sectors (Doellgast and Greer 2007; Holst et al. 2010).   
 
Findings question the concept of “skill specificity” and suggest that the relationship between 
skills and employment stability is not as tightly coupled as described in the Varieties of 
Capitalism and dualization literature. Industrial relations are fundamental for limiting the 
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casualization of work as skills can only partly protect workers, especially because the work 
organization is routine. By bringing new evidence on the casualization of the employment 
relationship in the disputed “core” of the German economy, this paper also contributes to the 
debate about the trajectory of the German model, suggesting that liberalization has the potential 
to progress also in core manufacturing sectors even though the employment relationship is still 
predominantly coordinated.   
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section derives the propositions regarding the 
influence of skills and work organization on the probability of being on a temporary contract. 
The third section presents the methodology. The fourth and fifth sections contain respectively 
the quantitative and the qualitative analysis. The sixth section concludes.  
 
2 The role of skills, industrial relations and work organization for the expansion of 
temporary work 
The German system of industrial relations institutions has been eroding in the last twenty years. 
Collective bargaining coverage has been declining also in the manufacturing sector (Addison 
et al. 2014) and works councils, despite their formal bargaining rights, have decreasing 
influence on employers’ staffing strategies due to the increasing pressure of reducing labor 
costs and the incumbent threat of plant closure and outsourcing (Rehder 2003). Union density 
has been declining after the re-unification membership boom and, while the automotive and 
steel industries are still well organized, union density greatly varies in the chemical and 
electronics industries (Bispinck and Dribbusch 2011). The use of temporary work has been 
progressively deregulated since the nineties, culminating with the Hartz reforms. These lifted 
any limitation to the maximum duration and any obligation to motivate agency contracts, and 
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allowed derogations by collective agreement to the principle of equal pay (Benassi and 
Dorigatti 2015).  
 
As mentioned above, the implications of declining legal and negotiated employment protection 
for stable employment in German core manufacturing sectors are widely debated in the 
literature, a controversy reflecting the ambiguity of the expression “beneficial constraints”. The 
different positions are illustrated through the following propositions, which discuss how the 
effect of workers’ industry-specific skills and work organization on the incidence of temporary 
work has changed under the erosion of industrial relations. They are formulated at the 
individual level because the available dataset is a workers’ survey (see the methodology 
section).  
 
The VoC literature emphasizes the beneficial role of institutions, which contribute to 
employers’ competitive advantage (Hall and Soskice 2001). Employment protection represents 
an incentive for workers to invest in skills which are transferable only to a limited extent 
because they have the guarantee of job security. In turn, employers are interested in retaining 
those workers who acquired skills specific to the company through vocational training because 
they want a return on their investment (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001). As a 
stable skilled workforce is necessary to the German high-quality manufacturing production, 
employers are expected to maintain the “complementarity” between stable employment and 
workforce skills despite institutional erosion (Hancké et al. 2007: 11f.; Soskice 1999). Hassel 
(2014) and Palier and Thelen (2010) suggest that employers’ commitment contributed to 
preventing the liberalization of the employment relationship in the core. Employers would hire 
temporary workers only in low-skill positions, mostly in direct production, for compressing 
labor costs and for responding to their flexibility needs. Temporary workers would therefore 
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be hired during demand peaks and then dismissed in case of financial difficulties, serving as a 
flexibility buffer which protects the permanent skilled workforce. These considerations lead to 
the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 1: In German core manufacturing sectors only workers without industry-specific 
skills have become more likely to be on a temporary contract over time.  
 
In contrast with the VoC literature, industrial relations research points out the constraining role 
of institutions, claiming that employers offer a permanent position to their trainees due to the 
negotiated and legal employment protection (Scherer 2005). This claim is corroborated by 
existing research suggesting that “specific” skills are not necessarily coupled with stable 
employment. The skills provided by the German dual vocational training system are 
occupational and portable across employers (Marsden 1999; Streeck 2011; Thelen and 
Busemeyer 2012); furthermore, German companies sometimes train above their needs and 
therefore employ their young Facharbeiter in unskilled positions until a skilled position 
becomes vacant (Franz and Zimmermann 1999).  
 
Therefore, German manufacturing employers can be expected to make use of cheap and 
flexible workforce when negotiated and legal employment protection declines (Benassi and 
Dorigatti 2015; Doellgast and Greer 2007; Streeck 2009). The risk for employers to lose their 
investment in training is at a minimum as workers might see temporary contracts as a necessary 
– and possibly short - transition period to a permanent position. Looking at occupational labor 
market in the UK, Marsden (2010) described this phenomenon as “extended entry 
tournaments”: While hoping to be hired in a permanent position, skilled workers accept lower 
wages and temporary contracts even for long periods, and some of them might even remain 
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outside companies’ internal labor markets. Employers benefit of this system not only through 
lower salaries but also because they have a long screening period for the candidates who have 
acquired experience also in other companies (Marsden 2010). These observations lead to an 
alternative proposition to Proposition 1: 
 
Proposition 2: In German core manufacturing sectors workers with industry-specific skills 
have become more likely to be on a temporary contract over time. 
 
Stable employment has been argued as necessary to the German manufacturing production not 
only because employers want a return on their skill investment, but also because task autonomy 
and complexity require mutual trust and commitment (Marsden 1999). While the comparative 
political economy literature has often assumed that German core manufacturing sectors are 
characterized by non-Tayloristic work organization given the high rates of Facharbeiter2 (see 
Jürgens 2004 for a similar point), industrial sociology research found that the integrated work 
organization characterized only certain occupational profiles. Work in direct production, 
especially on the assembly line, has mainly been organized along Fordist lines (Roth 1997; 
Schumann at al. 1994), and work has become overall more standardised and routinized during 
the nineties (Springer 1999). In his recent analysis of the survey of the European Working 
Conditions Observatory, Marsden (2015) found that the work organization in around 65% 
German firms does not include job discretion, autonomy and problem-solving (even though 
the rate is still low compared to the UK).   
 
These findings suggest that routine work organization might have an independent effect from 
formal qualifications on the incidence of temporary work. Temporary workers have been found 
more likely to perform routine, repetitive and low-discretion tasks (Egger and Grossmann 
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2005; Lepak et al. 2003: 688; Letourneux 1998) which can be easily learned and do not require 
great work experience. As employers can easily hire temporary workers in routine positions, 
industrial relations institutions are fundamental for preventing the casualization of that type of 
jobs. Given the weakening of industrial relations institutions in German core manufacturing 
sectors, the following propositions can be derived:  
 
Proposition 3a: In German core manufacturing sectors workers in highly routine job positions 
have become more likely to be on a temporary contract over time. 
 
Existing research found that lean management techniques made the labor process increasingly 
standardized and routine also in qualified positions, putting an end to the “model of the poised 
and autonomous Facharbeiter” (Lacher 2006: 88; see also Buch 2006). Therefore, under the 
erosion of institutionalized employment protection it can be expected that work routinization 
has progressively increased the likelihood of Facharbeiter to be on a temporary contract. The 
following propositions can be derived: 
 
Proposition 3b: In German core manufacturing sectors the effect of routine on the likelihood 
to be on a temporary contract has increased over time also among workers with industry-
specific skills.  
 
The next section illustrates the methods used for testing the above propositions against 
empirical evidence.  
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4 Methodology  
The regression analysis is based on the Workers’ Survey from the German Federal Institute for 
Vocational Training and Education (BiBB). Five waves are taken into consideration: 1985/86, 
1991/92, 1998/99, 2005/06 and 2011/12. Even though the surveys do not follow either the same 
individuals or the same companies over time, the sample is representative for the population in 
every survey year.   
 
The population is restricted to the blue-collar workforce in core manufacturing sectors: 
chemicals, steel, forging, machine tool building, automotive, white goods, electronics, fine 
mechanics, ship and airplane building. These sectors are representative for the core of the 
German economy because they are export-oriented (DeStatis 2015), and traditionally 
characterized by a high-skill and high value-added production and by strong industrial relations 
and social partnership tradition (Kädtler and Hertle 1997; Kern and Schumann 1984). The 
analysis considers only the active German population (at least 10 working hours a week) aged 
between 15 and 64, and trainees have been excluded.  
 
A pooled logistic regression analysis was run with robust standard errors using the STATA 
software. The dependent variable, which is the probability of being on a temporary contract, is 
dichotomous (1=temporary contract; 0=permanent contract). This variable includes workers 
on fixed-term contracts and on agency contracts, for which employers need to pay social 
security contributions (sozialversicherungspflichtige Beschäftigte); however, it excludes 
workers on freelance contracts and on marginal employment contracts (e.g. minijobs), and 
therefore might underestimate the diffusion of temporary work. The logistic regression analysis 
tests a simple model and three interactive logistic models, which aim at testing the conditional 
effect respectively of skill specificity and job routine on the probability of being on a temporary 
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contract given increasing institutional erosion over time. Model II and III contain only one 
interaction term each for testing respectively the propositions 1, 2 and 3a. Model IV is the full 
interacted model, which includes all the interaction terms and the constituent terms, as 
prescribed by Brambor et al. (2006). This model furthers the analysis of the interaction effect 
between skills, work organization and time on the probability of being on a temporary contract 
(proposition 3b).  
 
The simple model and the interactive models look as follows:  
 
(I) Temporary contract= β0+ Σ β1CONTROLSit  + β2 routineit+ β3 skill specificityit+ β4 
timeit+ εit 
 
(II) Temporary contract= β0+ Σ β1CONTROLSit  + β2 routineit+ β3 skill specificityit+ β4 timeit 
+ β5 timeit*skill specificityit+ εit 
 
(III) Temporary contract= β0+ Σ β1CONTROLSit  + β2 routineit+ β3 skill specificityit+ β4 timeit 
+ β5 timet*routineit+ εit 
 
(IV) Temporary contract= β0+ Σ β1CONTROLSit  + β2 routineit+ β3 skill specificityit+ β4 timeit 
+ β5 timet*routineit+ β6 timeit*skill specificityit + β7 skill specificityit*routineit+ β8 
timeit*skill specificityit*routineit + εit 
 
I operationalize my independent variables as follows. The dummy variable Skill specificity 
refers to workers who have their last vocational training degree in an occupation which 
traditionally belongs to core manufacturing sectors (ISCO 1985/86: from 1210 to 1541 and 
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from 1910 to 3237/ ISCO88: from 10 to 15 and from 19 to 32). This operationalization allows 
discriminating between specialized manufacturing workers and those workers with a dual 
vocational training in other occupations, who are also widely employed in the manufacturing 
industry but do not have skills specific for the manufacturing sector/occupations.3 By so doing, 
the variable represents a good proxy for the above mentioned Facharbeiter, who traditionally 
constitute the core “specific-skilled” workforce in the German manufacturing sector.  
 
The variable Job routine was operationalized through the survey question “How often do you 
repeat the same work procedure?”. It takes value 1 if the answer is “always/often” and 0 for 
“rarely/never” (see appendix). This measurement reflects the findings of Lacher (2006) and 
Springer (1999) as well as the interview findings in this paper (see section 6), which emphasize 
the routine of work tasks in German core manufacturing sectors. The choice of this variable 
can be argued to have some limitations: First, the survey unfortunately does not include the 
question of whether the work pace is dictated by a machine, which has also often been used as 
a measure of job routine in manufacturing (e.g. Bailey 1993); however, the measurement in 
this paper is rightly broader as workers in industrial services (such as logistics) are likely to 
have a repetitive job even though the pace is not dictated by a machine such as for assembly 
line workers. Second, the measure of job routine is a perception of workers, which could be 
argued to be endogenous to the type of contract. This linkage would however be counter-
intuitive because temporary workers should find their work less repetitive as they can be 
reasonably assumed to work in the same job positions for shorter time periods. Following this 
reasoning, old workers should be more likely to find their job routinized; indeed, across all 
waves 54% workers between 15 and 25 declared that their work was highly routinized against 
60% among workers between 55 and 64.  
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The erosion of negotiated and legal employment protection was operationalized through the 
time variable because the dataset does not provide information on the presence and strength of 
industrial relations at workplace. However, the effect of the weakening of industrial relations 
and of the relaxation of labor market regulation on workers’ outcomes in Germany was widely 
studied in the literature (Brenke and Eichhorst 2008; Eichhorst and Marx 2011; Promberger 
2006). Furthermore, the case study findings illustrate in detail how national labor market 
reforms and workplace concession bargaining influence the use of temporary work, tracing the 
causal mechanism linking the weakening legislative and negotiated employment protection to 
the probability of being on a temporary contract.  
 
Time was coded as a continuous variable taking the values from 1 to 5 in order to facilitate the 
interpretation of the interaction terms and to save degrees of freedom, as the use of dummy 
waves would have required the inclusion of eight interaction terms between job routine and 
skill specificity and four wave dummies (excluding the wave dummy used as reference 
category). In order to make sure that the effect of time follows a positive trend, the logistic 
regression was first run with the wave dummies instead of the continuous variable Time, 
confirming that the direction of the time effect does not change the direction between the 
waves, and showing a positive trend since 1992 (see online appendix).  
 
All models include control variables such as age, gender, local unemployment rate, the location 
of the workplace in Eastern Germany, the firm size and sectoral dummies (see the 
operationalization in the online appendix). A correlation table is available in the appendix. 
5 An analysis of skills, job routine and temporary work 
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Descriptive statistics. Table 2 shows that temporary work has been increasing from almost 5% 
in 1986 to 11% in 2012 within the whole workforce. Temporary work among workers with 
industry-specific skills has also been growing over time, and particularly among young workers 
- it increased by 24% between 1986 and 2012.  
 
TABLE 1  
 
Compared to permanent workers, higher rates of temporary workers report to work in routine 
job positions across all waves – their rates are between 2 and 6% higher. In addition, even 
though the trend is rising for the whole workforce, the rates of temporary workers in routine 
job positions increased more rapidly than for permanent workers as they went from 5.4% to 
13% while they increased from 3.5% to 7.2% for permanent workers.  
 
However, the employment of temporary workers in routine job positions does not necessarily 
reflect their skills (see Table A2 in the appendix). Temporary workers are more likely to feel 
overqualified and overskilled than permanent workers. The overqualification rates of 
permanent workers increased from 25% to 43% between 1986 and 1998 while 35.2% of 
temporary workers reported to feel overqualified in 1986 and 62.5% in 1998. Overskilling rates 
are lower but increasing: they went from 5.9% in 1998 to 11.2% in 2012 for permanent workers 
while the rates for temporary workers are twice as high (respectively 13.3% and 21.3%). This 
rising trend might also suggest that the high skill levels reported above might not be necessary 
and some tasks could be performed by workers with lower qualifications and experience.    
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Regression results. Table 2 shows the results of the logistic regression analysis. The logistic 
regressions with robust standard errors have been run using the STATA commands logit and 
robust. The log odds are reported. 
 
The results of Model I are the following: The variables “firm size” and “Eastern Germany” are 
positively correlated with the probability of being on a temporary contract. Male and old 
workers are less likely to be on a temporary contract than female and young workers. The time 
variable shows that workers have become more likely to be on a temporary contract over time. 
Having an industry-specific vocational training degree is negatively correlated with the 
probability of being on a temporary contract while job routine is positively correlated.  
 
Models II and III contain respectively the interaction terms “time*skill specificity” and 
“time*job routine”. Neither the interaction terms nor the constituent terms – which are non-
significant - can be interpreted from the table because the analytical interest lies “in the 
marginal effect of X on Y for substantively meaningful values of the conditioning variable Z” 
(Brambor et al. 2006: 74; see also Ai and Norton 2003). Following the command routine 
recommended by Brambor et al. (2006) and Williams (2012), the command margins is used to 
estimate the marginal effects of skill specificity and routine given each value of the time 
variable. The plot graphs are reported, which give a clear representation of the interaction term, 
but the tables with the values of the marginal effects, the standard errors and the confidence 
intervals are reported in the online appendix (Tables 1-6). Figure 1 reports the plot for the 
marginal effect of skill specificity on the probability of being on a temporary contract over time 
(1=1985…5=2012). The line shows that the marginal effect is significant since 1992 and 
negative, which means that the negative effect of skill specificity on the probability of being 
on a temporary contract has been increasing over time. Figure 2 represents the interaction term 
15 
 
through predicted probabilities: The probability of being on a temporary contract has become 
higher for workers without industry-specific skills than for workers with those skills. However, 
it also shows that both categories of workers have become more likely to be on a temporary 
contract.  
 
Figure 1 and 2  
 
Figure 3 reports the plot for the marginal effect of job routine on the probability of being on a 
temporary contract, showing that the positive marginal effect of job routine has been increasing 
over time. Figure 4 reports that the probability of being on a temporary contract for workers in 
routine job positions has increased over time and to a greater extent than the probability for 
workers who are not employed in routine job positions.  
 
Figure 3 and 4 
 
Model IV includes two additional interaction terms: the term job routine*specific skills allows 
the analysis of the marginal effect of job routine on the probability of being on a temporary 
contract conditional on workers’ skills. The term job routine*specific skills*time is used for 
the analysis of how the marginal effect of job routine on the probability of being on a temporary 
contract changes over time for workers with industry-specific skills. Figure 5 shows that the 
marginal effect of job routine on the probability of being on a temporary contract is lower for 
workers with a dual vocational training degree than for workers without those skills. Figure 6 
shows that the marginal effect of job routine on the probability of being on a temporary contract 
has increased over time among workers with industry-specific skills even though it is not 
significant for the last wave.  
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Figure 5 and 6 
 
Further logistic regressions have been run as robustness checks (see online appendix). First, 
the regression has been run with standard errors clustered by sector and by Federal State as the 
observations might be correlated e.g. through common technology, or labor market regulation 
at regional level. The significance level and the coefficients of skill specificity and job routine 
do not change. Second, the regression has been run without Eastern Germany, as the exclusion 
of Eastern Germany from the sample was recommended by BiBB researchers (Rohrbach-
Schmidt and Tiemann 2013) but the model does not show any relevant change.  
 
Third, the logistic regression has been run only on companies with more than 500 employees, 
which have almost 100% coverage of works councils and a sectoral bargaining coverage going 
from 93.9% in 1995 to 76.9% in 2010 (Benassi 2014: 69). In this way, the analysis checks 
whether the results have been biased by missing the control variable “industrial relations”, 
which has been found significant in studies on temporary work at company level (e.g. Davis-
Blake and Uzzi 1993). It could be argued that the probability of being on a temporary contract 
has not increased in establishments covered by sectoral agreements and with strong workplace 
representation; or that skills and job routine do not have independent effects in companies with 
strong internal labor markets rules because works councils ensure a correspondence between 
workers’ qualifications and complex job positions. However, both the simple model and the 
interactive model show that both coefficients for “job routine” and “time” are positive and 
significant. The analysis of the interactions terms “job routine*time” and “job 
routine*time*specific skills” gives similar results as the analysis conducted on the whole 
sample. In contrast, the variable “specific skills” is non-significant even when the logistic 
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regression is run without the variable “job routine”. The interaction term “specific skills*time” 
might be non-significant because big companies have the ability to recruit workers with 
industry-specific skills even on temporary contracts. These results strengthen rather than 
undermine the argument of the paper that skill “specificity” does not necessarily lead to stable 
employment.  
 
This section has shown that, first, workers with a dual vocational training degree are less likely 
to be on temporary contracts compared to workers without those qualifications – and the gap 
has widened over time. Furthermore, workers in routine jobs are more likely to be on a 
temporary contract, and the likelihood has increased over time. These findings confirm a 
“dualization” scenario. However, also workers with a dual vocational training degree have 
become more likely to be on a temporary contracts over time, showing that skill “specificity” 
does not fully protect workers from casualization. In addition, the analysis has shown that the 
marginal effect of job routine on the probability of being on a temporary contract has been 
increasing over time even among specific skilled workers. These findings suggest that there is 
scope to casualize work also among workers with industry-specific skills, also thanks to the 
routine nature of job.  
 
The qualitative analysis in the following section investigates this pattern of diffusion of 
temporary contracts also among workers with industry-specific skills and for the continuing 
association between specific skills and permanent contract, which cannot be fully explained by 
the complex work organization.  
 
 
Case study findings 
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The case study findings complement the quantitative analysis because they help to map out the 
effect of labor market reforms and collective bargaining on the relationship between skills, 
work organization and temporary work. They rely on semi-structured qualitative interviews 
conducted either by phone or in person between January 2011 and April 2013. The interview 
partners were human resource managers, union representatives and works councillors in five 
automotive plants and two machine tool building plants, and included also officials of the 
German metal union IG Metall who had extensively worked on the issue of temporary work 
either in the headquarters or in local union offices. The two sectors have been selected because 
they represent a critical case for studying the liberalization of the employment relationship as 
past research took them as paramount examples of the German model of production (Kern and 
Schuman 1984; Streeck 1991). However, it needs to be noted that the dynamics uncovered in 
the interviews in the automotive and machine tool building industry might not perfectly apply 
to other core manufacturing sectors (e.g. the chemical sector).  
 
Is stable employment necessary?  
The interviews both with employers and employees report that there are broad segments in core 
manufacturing sectors where temporary and permanent workers do not need either firm-
specific or sector-specific skills and the training time is very short, especially in direct 
production. A works councillor in an automotive plant in Bavaria, who worked in the body 
shop of a big automotive plant for thirty years, suggested that for complex tasks such as welding 
“even” one day is necessary but two or three hours of training are sufficient for working on the 
assembly line. Works councillors and union representatives pointed out that standardization 
and job routine reduce the necessity for complex knowledge, facilitating the employment of 
temporary workers in certain production areas. The following quote from a works councillor 
illustrates this: 
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“Nowadays the work processes are so standardized that anyone with a vocational training degree as electrician 
could repair the circuits either for Ford or for BMW, it is the same. Today everyone is available and disposable at 
any time” (Works councillor A 19.04.2012) 
 
An IG Metall official in Lower Saxony even suggested that the expansion of temporary work 
is an unofficial way to “break out” from the traditional vocational training system as employers 
cannot do it officially for political reasons, at least at the automotive plant he was closely 
working with. Instead of training (and then retaining) Facharbeiter who do a “very silly job at 
the assembly line” and “some pro forma teamwork”, they would hire semi-skilled workers on 
temporary contracts. Employers have, indeed, reduced their commitment to dual vocational 
training in metal professions, which has become more selective and does not provide anymore 
“abundant skills” to the workforce (IG Metall 2013; Thelen and Busemeyer 2012).  
 
Both employers and works councillors reported that the temporary workforce is often as skilled 
as the standard workforce; especially in the case of agency workers, employers can just “order” 
workers with the required qualifications. Similarly, a works councillor in an automotive plant 
suggested that Facharbeiter qualifications are no longer exclusive to the “core” workforce and 
that temporary workers with appropriate qualifications can be employed everywhere:  
 
“it [the phenomenon of temporary work] has become a real labor market, where workers have all the qualifications 
you need. It might be that it [the use of temporary workers] does not work in some job positions. Still, today it is 
not a problem after a certain training time to employ them [temporary workers], it’s no big deal. Regarding 
toolmaking, the toolmakers used to say: 'We are not replaceable'. But now you can get it [the work done] 
everywhere in the world. You can do it everywhere” (Works councillor A 19.04.2012) 
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Furthermore, temporary workers are sometimes employed in the same positions for months 
and even for years. In those cases, they accept working on temporary contracts in the hope of 
being hired permanently. A similar mechanism applies to the case of trainees, who have been 
increasingly offered temporary contracts at the end of their dual vocational training in the last 
few years. In this way, employers enjoy the benefits of a young and qualified workforce but 
can decide to dismiss them when there is a crisis and when there are no vacancies in skilled 
positions (DGB Bundesvorstand 2009; IG Metall 23.07.2012; IG Metall Jugend 13.08.2010). 
 
The role of (weakening) constraints for employers’ strategies 
Works councils and union representatives identified the main cause for the growth of temporary 
work in labor market deregulation – in particular, the liberalization of the use of fixed-term and 
agency work which started in the mid-nineties and culminated with the Hartz reforms. A works 
councillor in an automotive plant in Eastern Germany claimed that “thanks to the legislation 
employers can take decisions on their own on certain issues [temporary work]”, despite the 
presence of works councils in the workplace. Furthermore, the collective agreements signed by 
the DGB unions for the agency sector set very low standards but made agency workers 
politically acceptable, making negotiations for works councils even more difficult.  
 
The casualization of work took place also in companies with strong industrial relations because 
works councils were under pressure of cost-cutting and the threat of outsourcing, and therefore 
implicitly accepted the cost reduction through temporary work. However, works councils 
resisted the employment of temporary workers among Facharbeiter and tried to enforce 
internal labor market rules. For instance, a human resource manager of an automotive company 
explained that temporary workers could be employed as skilled workers but they are employed 
in unskilled positions because works councils push permanent skilled employees in unskilled 
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positions up the career ladder as soon as there is a vacancy for a Facharbeiter. Indeed, at the 
BMW plant in Leipzig, where the works council’s power was limited by the high 
unemployment rate and the threat of locating the plant in Eastern Europe, one third of the 
employees are on agency contracts at all skill levels (Benassi 2013).  
 
Works councillors and union representatives stressed the role of labor for enforcing internal 
labor market rules also in regard to the permanent hiring of trainees. An IG Metall union official 
who worked very closely with a large automotive company, illustrated this mechanism:  
 
“If a company such as X could break out of the vocational training system, they would probably do it and would 
hire only semi-skilled…But obviously there is an obligation for X to train people, to hire Facharbeiter and to pay 
their qualification in an appropriate way. IG Metall provides that X does not break out” (IG Metall official 
24.09.2012) 
 
However, as also mentioned above, this does not happen in all companies, and trainees are 
more and more frequently hired on a temporary contract first. As a result, IG Metall conducted 
a campaign between 2009 and 2012 aimed at (re)regulating the hiring of trainees. In May 2012 
IG Metall signed a collective agreement which guarantees at least a one-year contract to all 
trainees (IG Metall 23.05.2012).  
 
The interview findings show that there is a broad scope for employers to casualize work. They 
show, first, that many job positions, even though they might be occupied by skilled workers, 
do not require specific qualifications. Second, temporary workers can be easily employed 
because of the routine nature of work; furthermore, they can even be employed in more 
complex skilled positions because they are qualified and willing to stay. Third, labor market 
deregulation and the increasing pressure of works councils for concession bargaining have 
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weakened the institutional constraints supporting the traditional German production model. As 
a consequence, temporary work spread and young skilled workers are increasingly affected by 
casualization even though workers with a dual vocational training degree are still given priority 
to their career ladder.  
 
Discussion  
This article illustrated the extent to which temporary work has spread in German core 
manufacturing sectors and provided an overview of the mechanisms underlying its patterns of 
diffusion. Findings confirm a “dualization” scenario as workers without a dual vocational 
training degree are more likely to be on a temporary contract than Facharbeiter, and the divide 
between the two groups increases over time. However, the evidence also suggests that 
dualization is not necessarily due to specific skill requirements and a complex work 
organisation, preventing employers from using temporary work. The interviews have rather 
shown that works councils have played a fundamental role in this regard, pushing skilled 
workers up the career ladder within the company’s internal labor market. Furthermore, the 
works councils in the case studies still managed to ensure the permanent hiring of trainees. 
This is compatible with existing research evidence showing that works councils have been 
crucial in bargaining working conditions and internal flexibility arrangements for the “core” 
workforce in the German manufacturing sector (Eichhorst 2015; Hassel 2014; Seifert and 
Massa-Wirth 2005). The resilience of internal labor markets and the crucial role of works 
councils were particularly evident during the recent economic crisis, as employers bargained 
short-time work arrangements for permanent workers while they just dismissed temporary 
workers in order to cope with the downward demand (Lehndorff 2012).  
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On the other hand, workers with industry-specific skills have also become more likely to be on 
a temporary contract since the eighties. Findings suggest that the “specificity” of skills has been 
overestimated in the political economy literature, as temporary workers can easily be employed 
in different positions with a short on-the-job training, also thanks to the routine nature of jobs. 
Furthermore, the evidence shows that works councils have started losing control over 
employers’ staffing practices “at the margins” of the internal labor markets, e.g. in regard to 
workers in routine job positions or to new hires from the dual vocational training. Indeed, the 
union IG Metall actively intervened to negotiate provisions regarding the hiring of young 
Facharbeiter for at least one year after the end of the vocational training. Labor market 
deregulation and the lack of effective collective agreements on temporary work in the metal 
sector were found to constrain works councils’ ability to enforce employment protection for 
the whole workforce.   
 
By providing a detailed picture of the diffusion of temporary work in German core 
manufacturing sectors, this article conciliates the different expectations derived from the 
literature, contributing to the existing debate about the role of employers’ interest in skills 
(Gebel and Giesecke 2011; Hall and Soskice 2001) vs. industrial relations (Lloyd et al. 2013; 
Streeck 1991) for stable employment. While confirming the “dualization” scenario, findings 
have suggested that employers’ interests in a stable workforce have been overestimated, 
corroborating existing criticism of the VoC concept of “specific skills” and its usefulness in 
the analysis of labor market outcomes (e.g. Streeck 2011). Evidence has shown that the 
resilience and the erosion of industrial relations are fundamental for understanding how 
temporary work spread in German core manufacturing sectors, supporting research showing 
the impact of industrial relations institutions on workplace outcomes (e.g. Doellgast 2010; 
Lloyd et al. 2013). 
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This new micro-level evidence contributes also to the broad macro-level debate about the 
trajectory of coordinated economies. It shows that the employment relationship is still 
predominantly “coordinated” in core manufacturing sectors (Hassel 2014; Thelen 2014), as 
most skilled workers are on permanent contracts and works councils can still influence 
employers’ staffing strategies to a great extent. However, the paper has also shown that 
liberalization has exposed all workers to the casualization of work, suggesting that 
liberalization might not spare the core in the long run even though it proceeds at a slow pace 
(Baccaro and Benassi 2014; Baccaro and Howell 2011; Streeck 2009).  
 
The paper hints at different directions for further research. High overqualification and 
overskilling levels and the interview findings suggest that formal qualifications do not reflect 
job requirements, raising the question to what extent employers have an interest in providing 
training. Furthermore, some interview findings suggested that employers could casualize 
employment to a greater extent than the literature expected without incurring in any costs. 
Therefore, more research would be needed to assess the extent to which employers need a 
skilled and stable workforce, and whether they face costs when they depart from the traditional 
production model, as suggested by arguments on “beneficial constraints”. Finally, job routine 
is likely to be only one of the factors favoring the expansion of temporary work. The 
standardization of technologies across the industry and changes in the required knowledge - 
such as narrowing from broad to more specific competencies - are likely to have taken place 
and to have contributed to further facilitating the employment of temporary workers. 
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Tables and figures  
Table 1: : The diffusion of temporary work (1986 – 2012) 
 1986 1992 1998 2006 2012 Rate difference (1986-2012) 
Within the total workforce (%) 
 4.45 6.26 8.26 8.25 10.37 +5.92 
Among specific skilled workers (%) 
 4.56 4.74 6.12 8.06 7.05 +2.49 
Among specific-skilled workers by age (%) 
15-25 9.32 6.83 18.29 37.7 33.33 +24.01 
45-65 6.63 5.19 9.55 15.32 14.44 +7.81 
n.observations=10,420 
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Table 2: Logistic regression table 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
VARIABLES No interaction Interaction  
specific skills*time 
Interaction  
routine*time 
Fully interacted 
 model 
     
Specific skills -0.509*** -0.0985 -0.509*** -0.383 
 (0.0990) (0.228) (0.0990) (0.405) 
Job routine 0.412*** 0.411*** 0.243 0.0428 
 (0.0890) (0.0891) (0.215) (0.418) 
Time trend 0.268*** 0.361*** 0.231*** 0.235* 
 (0.0377) (0.0585) (0.0573) (0.121) 
Specific skills*time  -0.143**  -0.00451 
  (0.0712)  (0.135) 
Job routine*time   0.0612 0.166 
   (0.0703) (0.136) 
Job routine*specific skills    0.379 
    (0.488) 
Job routine*specific skills*time    -0.187 
(0.160) 
     
Local unemployment rate 0.0367** 0.0371** 0.0367** 0.0373** 
 (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152) 
Male respondent -0.215* -0.206 -0.213* -0.198 
 (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.126) 
Reference category: age 15-25 
 
    
26-35 -1.037*** -1.037*** -1.037*** -1.037*** 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) 
36-45 -1.504*** -1.504*** -1.506*** -1.505*** 
 (0.129) (0.129) (0.129) (0.130) 
46-55 -1.566*** -1.569*** -1.568*** -1.571*** 
 (0.139) (0.139) (0.139) (0.140) 
56-65 -1.624*** -1.624*** -1.630*** -1.627*** 
 (0.186) (0.186) (0.186) (0.187) 
     
Reference category for firm size:<10 employees 
 
10≤ employees ≤500 0.406*** 0.409*** 0.407*** 0.409*** 
 (0.115) (0.116) (0.115) (0.116) 
>500 employees 0.153 0.165 0.156 0.169 
 (0.118) (0.119) (0.118) (0.119) 
Eastern Germany 0.823*** 0.833*** 0.826*** 0.836*** 
 (0.131) (0.132) (0.131) (0.132) 
Sectoral dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant -2.791*** -3.083*** -2.694*** -2.820*** 
 (0.322) (0.361) (0.341) (0.468) 
     
     
Wald chi2 
Prob>chi2 
Pseudo R2 
426.42 
0.000 
0.0838 
431.93 
0.000 
0.0846 
429.06 
0.000 
0.0839 
437.93 
0.000 
0.0851 
Observations 9,922 9,922 9,922 9,922 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1: Average Marginal Effects of skill 
specificity with 95% confidence intervals 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Predicted probabilities of skill specificity 
with 95% confidence interval 
upper curve: specific skills =0 
lower curve: specific skills =1  
 
Figure 3: Average Marginal Effects of job routine 
with 95% confidence intervals 
 
 
Figure 4: Predicted probabilities of job routine with 
95% confidence interval
 
upper curve: job routine=1 
lower curve: job routine=0 
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Figure 5: Average Marginal Effects of job routine at different values of skill specificity with 95% confidence 
intervals 
 
Figure 6: Average Marginal Effects of job routine among specific skilled workers at different time points with 95% 
confidence intervals 
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1 The term “Facharbeiter” is the German word indicating workers who completed a dual vocational training 
degree and is typically used for professional figures in the manufacturing sector.  
2 See e.g. the work by Emmenegger 2009 and Gebel and Giesecke 2011, who collapse the skill dimension with 
task complexity.  
3 In this regard, a few interview partners even told me the running joke that Opel is the biggest bakery in Germany 
because they employ workers with a dual vocatonal training in baking professions. See also  Lüde, R. v. (1996) 
Die Reorganisation der Fabrik und die Wiederentdeckung der Arbeit. Perspektiven für Bildung und Qualifizierung 
in der Industriegesellschaft, Wiesbaden, Springer. 
                                                 
